the price of the quantity of maize grown on it would fetch only 40 lei; nevertheless the peasant owner persisted in cultivating his patch of land because he felt ashamed to allow it to lie fallow, having always been accustomed to cultivate it, and buy the maize he needed instead, for which, however, he would probably have to pay a somewhat higher price than the 40 lei at which he could have sold his own (p. 111). So that, far from exerting an adverse influence on production, the breaking up of the large estates has, on the contrary, proved to be the salvation of the industry, for were it not for the abnegation and attachment of the individual smallholder to his farm, agriculture would have been completely ruined by the policy imposed by the Bratianus. Indeed, one cannot but admire this profound devotion of the peasant to the land and his dogged persistence in carrying on, despite the odds which confronted him and the utter lack of encouragement he met with from the State. We may take it for granted that the small farm of five hectares was more productive than the large estates, even from official statistics. This peculiarity was commented on in the *Cuvantul* of July 23rd, 1927, which at the same time decried the maladministration of the then Finance Minister, M. Vintila Bratianu, and his threat to increase the land tax. That paper contested the official statement that the land tax in Rumania amounted to one gold franc per hectare, as this affirmation would cast a slur on the country. In fact it was estimated that in 1924 the export taxes on cereals had yielded the equivalent of a tax of 8 gold francs per hectare.

The determined perseverance of the peasantry could not undo the harm caused by the erroneous agrarian policy pursued, and the situation could not but grow worse with time.

So that when finally the National Peasant Party assumed power at the end of 1928, the situation had become so hopeless that the Rumanian Government even contemplated organizing a mass emigration to France and her colonies in order to relieve the strain. Early in 1929 the Press, commenting on this unexpected decision of the Government to encourage emigration, admitted that the cause of the disastrous condition agriculture had reached in Rumania could

241 be clearly traced to the carelessness with which the law of
423 land distribution had been drafted, and to the utter neglect
[511] to provide financial means for its rational application, as well
167 as to the export taxes on agricultural produce. The outcome
was appalling, as may be judged from an article in the *Cuvantul* in which, after dilating on the causes that had brought about this disaster, it was asserted: "We are obliged to admit that the entire rural population had reached a state of pauperism at a time when we should reasonably have expected it to be thriving, since it had been endowed with lands. It seems a paradox, yet we have only wrecked the old system of production, founded on the unjust system of latifundia, in order to replace serfdom by pauperism. At the time of the large estates the rural worker had no need to emigrate; on the contrary, there was a shortage of labour, and foreign labourers had to be admitted from neighbouring countries. To-day, however, we are forced to direct the rural population abroad so as to save it from starvation; that is the situation we have reached ten years after the enactment of the expropriation laws. . . ." According to the *Adeverul* of March 29th, 1929, the Minister for Agriculture, speaking about the state of that industry, drew a very dark picture and lamented the wretched condition to which agricultural production had fallen. Rumanian agriculture, once the source of wealth and the economic basis of the State, was, he said, on the verge of ruin. The Minister not only condemned the culpable manner in which the land distribution law had been carried out, but also denounced the laxity and incapacity of the functionaries who had been appointed to show the peasants new methods of cultivation. According to him, the so-called model school farms were a positive disgrace. . . . Apparently matters have not improved since, for
241 as late as March, 1932, one could read in the *Ellenzek*, a
874 paper published in Hungarian at Cluj, that the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transylvania had decided to present a petition to the League of Nations to demand the creation of an agricultural school destined exclusively for sons of Rumanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. One ought not to feel surprise that the Hungarian minority, convinced of the glaring ineptitude of the Rumanian administration, had

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad. [563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. 464 One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 The recruitment of workers for Germany has been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as 167 Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 In addition to the German administrators and 463 directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders, in the country.

727 About ~~40,000 Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was 722 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.